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Chapter 1: Introduction to the US War on Terror 
 
Did the terrorist attacks of September 11th change the way the United States ought 
to contain, confront, or neutralize threats abroad? Or, can the US use the same set of tools 
and responses in crafting a response to terrorist threats, present and future? These are the 
questions that underlie the debates, discussions, critiques, and conclusions throughout 
this work on the US war on terror. 
After Al Qaeda attacked the US on September 11th 2001, the US launched its war 
on terror. This global war builds upon the premises of the just war tradition while using 
the policies of the American neoconservative movement.1 In essence, the neoconservative 
movement takes a piecemeal approach to just war theory in order to meet its various 
goals. This is embodied by politicians from both the left and right that represent this 
movement, particularly those that run the current American administration. The reason is 
that the neo-conservative agenda has become a pervasive part of American foreign policy 
and any discussion of the US execution of the war on terror must necessarily include a 
discussion of neoconservative practices within its literature review. 
The question posed with regard to the war on terror as it is currently executed is 
whether it is just against measures of just war theory and other normative measures. 
Choosing the rubric of just war theory allows an evaluation of the US war on terror 
through measures that are prevalent in the international community.  
                                                 
1 The rationale here is that the international community uses accepted practices within just war theory to 
show causality for action or inaction as the case may be. The neoconservative interpretation of just war 
practices is at a near peak during the current American administration as further expanded in the literature 





The measurement of the successes and failures of the war on terror is grounded in 
the overarching framework of just war theory because it represents the prevailing norms 
and the international community understandings with regard to the conduct of war and 
armed conflict. For instance, the permissibility of action in war is rooted in causality. 
Does a state have an appropriate cause for action? Also, the permissibility of action in 
war is based upon the principle of proportion. Is a state’s response proportionate to the 
action that caused it? These are a few of the principles of just war theory and help to 
show how pervasive just war theory is in the legal framework of waging war.  
The thesis of this work believes that the US, despite its policy of preemption, has 
been successful in working within just war theory on the short term (tactical) level. 
However, in the long term (strategic) sense, where the goal is to ferret out the root causes 
of terrorism, the US has failed in the four years since September 11th.  
The second chapter is the literature review, which discusses the policies and 
philosophies of the neoconservative movement. The thinkers discussed are Leo Strauss, 
Irving Kristol, and Natan Sharansky. Each of these authors represents a different phase of 
neoconservative thinking. After discussing the neoconservative thinkers, individual 
policy makers are discussed with regard to how neoconservative strategies affect their 
policy decisions. Next, just war theory is discussed with regard to Michael Walzer 
because he encapsulates so much of traditional just war theory and has updated his 
theoretical work post September 11th, which makes him one of the few just war theorists 






The literature review lays the groundwork for the third chapter. Measurement 
criteria for evaluating the US war on terror are laid out in the third chapter. This begins 
with the temporal, short term tenets of just war theory and then attempts to improve just 
war theory by offering a lens by which to evaluate long term strategies and approaches 
for a just war on terror. In brief, this chapter takes the short term framework of just war 
theory as it applies to tactical uses of military, covert and financial tools. At the same 
time, this is applied against a long term framework of normative approaches to strategic 
measures of socio-political, economic, and religious dealings. The measurement criteria 
lays out a pragmatic approach by which the US war on terror is evaluated in the fourth 
chapter. This chapter concerns itself with presenting ethical and moral measures by 
which to judge the US war on terror. The reason that the evaluation is split into short term 
and long term measures is due to the real world circumstances that confront the US at 
each level. So while the tactics for evaluation may change, the overarching moral and 
ethical standards remain universal throughout.2 
The US war on terror is evaluated by looking at the US versus the Al Qaeda 
terrorist organization in Afghanistan as well as a limited treatment of the US invasion, 
occupation, and nation building actions in Iraq. The evaluation is based upon the 
measurement criteria laid out in the third chapter and attempts to answer several policy 
based decisions like what are the ramifications of the US war on terror? Or, what is its 
efficacy as compared to other possible strategies? This fourth chapter is laid out as a case 
study. 
                                                 
2 For instance, the short term goal of the war on terror is to neutralize current terrorist threats, e.g. Al 






The fifth and final chapter is a discussion of how the US can work within the 
international institutional framework in order to build coalitions that will, all at once, 
offset the costs of its war on terror and affect root cause change in regions in order to 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
This literature review is accomplished in two parts. First, literature and policies of 
the neoconservative movement are presented, analyzed, and critiqued. Second, the 
literature of just war theory with regard to Michael Walzer is presented, analyzed and 
critiqued.  The goal of this literature review is to unpack the terms, positions, theory, and 
policy of the neoconservative and just war establishments, respectively, and provide a 
sufficient critique of the established literature in order to ‘set the stage’ for the 
measurement criteria presented in chapter three.3 
2.1 Neo-Conservative Perspectives 
This section discusses various perspectives rooted within neoconservatism. As for 
terrorism response and neo-conservatives, there are no greater practitioners of this theory 
than the official within the Bush Administration. It is necessary to understand that neo-
conservatives spend little time in academia and tend to eschew scholarly discourse; 
instead, they favor engagement in the world of public policy. Much of the literature 
reviewed in the section on neo-conservatism and terror response is garnered from opinion 
editorials from major newspapers and periodicals as well as published works from 
conservative think tanks. Neo-conservatism is not a theory within international relations, 
per se, but is important to discuss because of the major public policy power that the neo-
conservatives wield in American foreign policy. 
                                                 
3 Additionally, the goal is to see how the neoconservative policies play with and against just war theory and 





The term neo-conservative is one of the most oft-used, least understood terms in 
modern international relations and political science. I will attempt an exhaustive 
definition of this term to understand what neo-conservatives stand for but also what they 
are not at the same time. After defining key terms, the review of the literature will then 
discuss the ideas of neo-conservatism followed by a discussion of the practitioners of 
American neo-conservatism.  
Neo-conservatives may be defined as those who want the US to be the world's 
unchallenged superpower, share unwavering support for Israel, support American 
unilateral action, support preemptive strikes to remove perceived threats to US security, 
promote the development of an American empire, equate American power with the 
potential for world peace, seek to democratize the Arab world and push regime change in 
states deemed threats to the US or its allies.4 Neo-conservatives tend to have roots in 
some sort of neo-liberal political economy5 so it is important for the reader to keep in 
mind that in some sort of basic terms, neo-conservatives advocate a near libertarian view 
of economics but only to the extent that it is beneficial to the United States advocating 
what ends up being, as one author called it, imperial hubris.6 Note that the neo-
conservative movement is not confined to the American right and also exists on the left 
as well.7 As it turns out, the left and right tend to agree on neo-conservative aims but 
disagree on the means by which to achieve those aims. 
                                                 
4 “Neocon Quiz.” The Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/neoConQuiz.pl. 30 
December 2004. 
5 “Neoconservative.” Disinfopedia. http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Neo-
conservative#Neoconservative_is_conservative_neoliberal. 18 December 2004. 
6 Anonymous. Imperial Hubris, Why the West is Losing the War on Terror. 2004. Washington DC.  
7 A neo-conservative can be a Democrat or a Republican. It could be plausibly argued that every US 
president since Ronald Reagan has been a neo-conservative of varying degrees. Also, some of the 





The so-called godfather of neo-conservatism is Irving Kristol. Kristol has likened 
neo-conservatism to less of a theory and definitively not a movement; instead, he prefers 
to call it a persuasion.8 Further, neo-conservatism is a purely American movement that 
has no parallel in any other part of the world.9 For the neo-conservative, the justification 
of ‘national interest’ is broad and malleable is used to justify a broad range of policies.  
The philosophy of Leo Strauss greatly influenced neo-conservatives.10 
Nevertheless, many are vehemently critical of Strauss saying that his views are analogous 
to fascist machinations hell bent on creating a world run by the intellectual right.11 If this 
seems strong, then it is probably because it is. In reality, Strauss, saw a world where 
democracy was essentially flawed but was the best form of government that humanity 
could produce. Democracy is the best tool in preserving liberty, thus making it the form 
of government that should be enacted throughout the world.12 What makes Strauss 
different than a democratic peace theorist is that Strauss was willing to see democracy 
spread at the tip of the sword. In addition, Strauss was a classical thinker that had a clear 
disdain for relativism. Strauss believed the world was black and white. However, by 
dying in 1973, Strauss would fail to see the neoconservative movement take hold in the 
US and it is also unclear what he would think of it. As the famous Straussian Alan Bloom 
said, "My only politics is philosophy."13 In short, traditional Straussian thinking did not 
                                                 
8 Kristol, Irving. “The Neoconservative Persuasion.” The Weekly Standard. 25 August 2003.  
9 Ibid. 
10 The reader will notice throughout this section on Strauss that very little reference is made to actual 
Straussian doctrine; this is important since it is unclear whether Strauss would consider himself a neo-
conservative of even agree with the ways in which he has been interpreted posthumously. As such, I have 
concentrated on the deification of Strauss by the neo-conservative persuasion.  
11 Steinberg, Jeffrey. “Profile: Leo Strauss, Fascist Godfather of the Neo-Cons.” Executive Intelligence 
Review. 21 March 2003.  
12 Berkowitz, Peter. “What Hath Strauss Wrought?” The Weekly Standard. 2 June 2003.  
13 Unknown. “Leo Strauss.” Brainy Encyclopedia.  





see the nexus between politics and philosophy. The reason Strauss is looked to by the 
neo-conservatives is because of the moral clarity that allowed a smooth transition from 
conservatism to its more active neo-conservative machination. 
As the neoconservative movement evolved, the nexus between philosophy and 
politics strengthened and eventually politics became the tool of choice for the 
neoconservative thinker. Gone were the days when Leo Strauss would philosophize on 
the sidelines of policy debates. In this new era, the neoconservative not only engaged in 
political debate, but had become principal decision makers in the world of public policy. 
Neo-conservatives possess a belief regarding terrorism that is best encapsulated by the 
following quote: 
 
We are in the midst of the first world war of the twenty-
first century, waged between the world of terror and the 
world of democracy, between a civilization in which 
human life is held in the highest value and one for which 
human life is merely an instrument to reach certain political 
aims. The world of democracy will win this struggle. But in 
order for the victory to be everlasting, it is crucial, but not 
sufficient, to destroy the terror. It is imperative to expand 
the world our enemies try to destroy, to export 
democracy.14 
 
Neo-conservatives wish to export American ideals abroad, which they believe 
will help to ferret out terrorists and end terrorist insurgency. Many of the prominent 
individuals in the Bush Administration are neoconservatives. The current policy 
objectives of the neoconservative Bush Administration focuses on the military side of 
foreign policy. Prior to September 11th, however, the neoconservative movement did not 
focus on an active military foreign policy. Instead, the neoconservative chose to promote 
                                                 
14 Sharansky, Natan. “Democracy for Peace.” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 





its objectives through strict liberal economic policy while maintaining moderate 
protective measures in the US for key industries, i.e. steel. This focus on economics is an 
attribute of the post Cold War shift from military answers to economic strategies. 
Evidence of this is apparent in the reduction in US military end strength during the 
1990’s.  
The catalyst of September 11th caused a shift from the economic tools of the 
1990’s to active military engagement. Neoconservative thinking post September 11th, 
believes in the pacifying effect of spreading democracy even at the cost of preemptive 
attack. This cost is great since it comes at the price of just war thinking that sets a very 
high bar for preemptive action.15 For instance, just war theory would not traditionally 
condone the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US. Therefore, if one can gain an 
understanding of the American neoconservative movement, then one will understand how 
the US attempts to frame its foreign policy. 
The change in neoconservative movement thinking from economic tools to active 
military engagement is a return to traditional Straussian thinking whereby the spread of 
democracy comes ‘at the tip of the sword’ as opposed to more passive economic 
measures. There is something intrinsically ironic about the idea of ‘forced democracy’ 
and it is a concept not discussed by neoconservative thinkers. The closest explanation that 
the neoconservatives discusses is the notion that desire for democracy is latent and the 
risk of revolution is more dangerous for a populous than the costs of inaction. Therefore, 
the US, because of its war fighting capability, can aid revolution by deposing despotic 
rulers. This then lowers the risk for a local populous to stand up a fledgling democracy. 
                                                 
15 Just war theory does allow for preemption to varying degrees but, practically speaking, the international 
community as represented by the UN General Assembly and Security Council has been reticent to condone 





However, in classic ‘do as I say not as I do’ fashion, the neoconservative ignores just war 
tenets and principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty in order to spread democracy.  
The neo-conservatives are extraordinarily savvy in crafting their message and 
they even advocate helping to change the image of America and other countries abroad 
through increased public diplomacy.16 Although, it seems to amount to little more than a 
‘smoke and mirrors’ public relations effort; propaganda or dogma analogous to the Cold 
War’s Radio Free Europe. 17 Nevertheless, the neoconservatives dogged determination 
has proved a potent foreign policy tool often outlasting its critics by never straying too far 
off message or simply depicting all opposition as unpatriotic thus cutting off debate. The 
foreign policy belief within neo-conservatism is to defend the American national interest 
by quelling terrorist insurgency and by exporting American style democracy, at whatever 
cost of political capital on the world stage. This completes the sense of what neo-
conservatives believe are necessary means in order to wage a successful war on terror. 
Next, are a few examples of policy application from the practitioners of American neo-
conservatism. 
High profile neo-conservative politician include Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz. The tragic events of September 11th, 2001 served as a sort of coming out 
party for a new and wholly brazen American foreign policy that justifies acts with little 
opposition or debate justified solely by the war on terror. The following are a few 
examples of the neo-conservative slant to the application of the United States foreign 
policy as it relates to the war on terrorism.  
                                                 
16 Rampton, Sheldon. “Terrorism to End Terrorism.” PR Watch. 4th Quarter 2001. 
17 Glassman, James K. “To Win Hearts and Minds, Get Serious.” American Enterprise Institute. 17 May 





To begin it would seem that for the American neo-conservative, democratic 
elections abroad have become a measure of success unparalleled to any other measure, 
e.g. equal protection, religious tolerance, women’s suffrage, etc.  Neo-conservatives 
believe in the primacy of ‘free and fair’ elections in Afghanistan and Iraq as the 
precursors to freedom from terrorism.18 This amounts to little more than spurious 
causation because while the neoconservative believes that democracy is the harbinger of 
stability, they do not account for the presence of solid infrastructure and institutions in 
the stability calculus. For instance, in terms of securing freedom, the neo-conservatives 
point to elections in Indonesia as a good first step in combating terror;19 unfortunately 
without solid institutionalized concepts of justice through toleration and openness, 
democracy alone will not help the neo-conservatives create an Indonesia free from the 
spawn of terror. 
As to the war in Iraq, the neoconservatives have created a policy by which action 
to remove terrorist sympathizers is a greater priority than any sort of regard for 
international law. The neoconservatives argued the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction, which was only the ostensible reason for action. Strauss argued that under 
select circumstances, government officials could deceive for reasons of expediency.20 In 
reality, the military action taken in Iraq was an attempt to secure a part of the world that 
had been confrontational to the United States. This is consistent within the ‘hawk’ 
community to follow their own prevailing interest rather than working with international 
                                                 
18 Safire, William. “The Fourth Election.” The New York Times. 1 December 2004. 
19 Wolfowitz, Paul. “The First Draft of Freedom.” The New York Times. 16 September 2004. 
20 Unknown. “Leo Straus.” Brainy Encyclopedia. 





legal instruments or institutions.21 In fact, it is indicative of the neoconservative mindset 
that blame for insurgency in Iraq is attributed to the fact that the United States has not 
exacted enough control of the country.22 
Finally, the proponents of neo-conservatism are vehement defenders of the enemy 
non-combatant status that is given to foreign terror suspects that are detained or captured 
in the so-called war on terror.23 The neo-conservatives have a notion that the provisions 
(they call them constraints) of the Geneva Convention do not apply since this is an action 
against a non-state actor, namely Al Qaeda. To the letter of the law, the neoconservatives 
are correct although the neoconservatives do not understand the protections of the 
conventions are about morals and ethics in war and more than simple definitions. The 
detention of the enemy combatants stands on wobbly legal ground in even a domestic 
sense, let alone provisions of international law.24 Nowhere is this more obvious than in 
the manner in which recent stories of interrogation by torture justified by the war on 
terror have emerged.25 Adding insult to injury, it appears that the neoconservatives knew 
that their actions were legally murky since their lawyers prepared classified memoranda 
detailing possible arguments to prove the permissibility of torture in set circumstances.26 
The practitioners of the neo-conservative persuasion appear to let little stop them 
from acting in the so-called national interest, even if that means treading on the law, 
rights, and principles of one’s own state. Now to follow is a brief critique of the 
overarching principles that appear in the neo-conservative persuasion.  
                                                 
21 Brooks, David. “Hawk vs. Hawk.” The New York Times. 14 September 2004. 
22 Friedman, Thomas L. “Iraq: Politics or Policy.” The New York Times. 3 October 2004. 
23 Lewis, Neil A. “Guantanamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court.” The New York Times. 8 
November 2004. 
24 Ibid. 






Neoconservatism is a persuasion or a movement since it can not be considered a 
theory. It seems to pick and choose from other theories, namely realism and liberalism, in 
order to achieve a set of policy aims; it is not rich in explanatory power and seems to 
have a definition that floats across the spectrum in order to suit a variety of needs. 
Second, it is a persuasion that is morally suspect and bereft of any sort of ethics of respect 
for dissimilar cultures. By placing a superlative value judgment upon the national interest 
of one’s own country it breeds a culture that is condescending. Third, and worst of all, the 
policies of the neo-conservative act with reckless regard for the intricacies of a society 
favoring the over simplistic axiom that democracy is a cure-all and justification for 
action; they go no further than ‘might makes right.’ In addition, there is this idea that Leo 
Strauss, Donald Kagan, and Irving Kristol have essentially birthed a theory that is more 
overrun by cliché and jingoist justifications than a credible response to terrorism.27 
The reckless export of democracy is more likely to create ethnic hatred and global 
instability (read: causes of terrorism) rather than acting against terrorist threats.28 Notice 
the word threat. Neo-conservatives tend to think in terms of neutralizing threats through 
reactive action. This knee-jerk reaction ignores the root cause of problems and is more 
like diplomatic triage than a coherent policy, let alone theory. 
In the end, the policies of the American neo-conservatives leave much to be 
desired. In partial contrast to the pervasive security and hegemonic concerns of the neo-
conservatives, come the theories just war theory in relation to Michael Walzer, which are 
discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
27 Lind, Michael. “A Tragedy of Errors.” The Nation. 5 February 2004. 
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040223&s=lind. 20 December 2004. 





2.2 Just War Theory 
 
Walzer is a prolific writer on the subject of just war and has approached the 
subject of terrorism as it relates to just war with careful qualification. He provides case 
evidence of his arguments against various historical illustrations. 
Instead of taking a broad look at Walzer’s moral arguments, I have instead chosen 
to concentrate on two main areas and subsets of his theory within each of these areas. The 
first area is his theory of aggression and the subjects of anticipation and intervention 
within the theory of aggression. The second area is what he loosely termed the ‘war 
convention’ and the subjects of noncombatant immunity and terrorism. The reason I have 
chosen these two areas is because they highlight the greatest points of contention between 
the neoconservative and just war movements. 
First, Walzer presents his theory of aggression, which is defined as the crime 
associated with war understood as the way that crime interrupts peace.29 Aggression, 
according to Walzer, is the only true crime that is transacted between states, all else being 
‘misdemeanors,’ e.g. trade sanctions, embargo, etc. Also, his argument is crafted as 
presenting the crime as a crime against the rights of political communities. In explicit 
terms, these are the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.30 In analyzing 
Walzer’s theory of aggression, I am struck with the importance he places on the ‘legalist 
paradigm.’  
 
Every reference to aggression as the international equivalent of armed 
robbery or murder, and every comparison of home or country to personal 
liberty and political independence, relies upon what is called the domestic 
                                                 







analogy. …These notions, I should stress, are not compatible with the fact 
that international society as it exists today is a radically imperfect 
structure.31 
 
Walzer’s words show that while it is tempting to draw a domestic analogy, it 
needs to be made with careful qualification since the judicial process of crime and 
punishment that exists at the domestic level has no analog in the international 
community. However, in creating a theory where states possess rights the same way that 
individuals do, Walzer has created two corollaries: First, while acknowledging that the 
‘domestic analogy’ is about as imperfect as the legal system of the international 
community, he sets a bar that asks the world to continue to improve and codify its rules 
of war so that it may act in the same way as domestic legal systems. This, however, is not 
particularly interesting.  
What is interesting is how Walzer fails to allow for individuals to wage war 
against a state or states. Walzer does not place equal weight on the individual and the 
state rights.32 This is a major weakness in his writing since, as a practical matter, 
individuals do wage war against states. Today, Osama bin Laden acts without the explicit 
approval of any state yet he wages war against Western powers, namely the United 
States. In addition to Osama bin Laden’s actions as a stateless individual, his actions 
supercede domestic social contracts when such actions are condoned by a state that he 
may reside in, i.e. Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. 
  Walzer would probably argue that a state waging a war on an individual runs the 
risk of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state. Nevertheless, if 
a state can make the careful distinction that states that either actively or passively harbor 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 





terrorists are themselves subject to aggression, then a state can be justified in waging war 
against not just an individual but also the state that may harbor that individual. The 
historical example of this is the manner in which the Bush Administration deposed the 
Taliban government of Afghanistan for its refusal to relinquish Osama bin Laden and his 
deputies. In critique, Walzer weaves a very tight argument over state’s rights but stops 
short of bridging the gap into a consolidated theory of how a state ought to confront 
terrorism, thus creating a major theoretical misstep for the reasons highlighted heretofore.  
He does, however, give a discussion on anticipations in the conduct of a just war. 
This is important since recent debate has highlighted the international community’s 
deficiency in dealing with the question of preemptive action where one state, absent 
material cassus belli, attacks another state based upon that states supposed intent. Walzer 
argues that several events must occur before anticipation may be judged as just or unjust. 
First, a statement of fact must be made and agreed as to who began the hostility.33 This 
statement is not a debate, it is historical fact. The argument goes on to say that just as in 
the domestic sense, a state may act preemptively so long as the attack is imminent and 
there is no room for deliberation. The practical problem is that the current construct 
within the international community is prohibitively restrictive in allowing anticipations.  
 
…states can rightfully defend themselves against violence that is 
imminent but not actual; …this is recognized  in domestic law and also in 
the legalist paradigm for international society. In most legal accounts, 
however, it is severely restricted. Indeed, once one has stated the 
restrictions, it is no longer clear whether the right has any substance at 
all.34 
 
                                                 







Simply put, while the theory of anticipation exists, practice has all but ruled it out 
as a just action. Finally, Walzer asks the reader to think of anticipation along a spectrum 
where at one end imminent strike requires quick and decisive action on the part of the 
state while the other end is the deliberate act of perpetrating a preventive war.35 He writes 
that, “States may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to 
do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence.”36 In 
analyzing this statement, I am struck by how permissive it is. Not only has Walzer 
created a major revision to the current international legalist paradigm, but he has also 
triggered several what if situations. Teetering on the line that divides theory and practice 
is a dangerous place to be because while theory may exist from the comfortable armchair 
of academia, a coherent policy must foresee the permutations that will challenge that 
policy. While Walzer’s statement makes sense in principle, he has definitional problems 
that I do not believe he has unpacked to a sufficient degree. This is important in the next 
chapter in the discussion of measurement criteria where Walzer’s position on anticipation 
is used as a starting point that is later expanded. As it relates to terrorism, Walzer’s notion 
of permissive anticipation is key in creating a coherent strategy as well as policy.  
Also within the theory of aggression and with the same vein as his section on 
anticipation, Walzer writes about interventions. Concerning the Iraq question, Walzer’s 
section on interventions lay important groundwork that is discussed in the next chapter 
because the US invasion of Iraq was an interventionist action so Walzer provides a good 
lens by which to judge that action.37 He begins by couching his argument by noting that 
the aggressor state can never be justified in war but that interventions are viewed in a 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 





different light and aren’t war at all but rather interventions with military means. That 
said, Walzer goes on to note because interventions are different, they carry a high bar for 
the state that is intervening to show to the international community its just cause for 
action. Walzer gives specific historical instances by which to judge the justness of an 
intervention ranging from civil wars to humanitarian interventions.38 The question of Iraq 
is dealt with in a subsequent work but he uses the basic model presented here to say that 
the war in Iraq was not justified based upon the evidence displayed in the run up to 
March 2003. Specifically, Walzer believes that while removing Saddam Hussein from 
power is moral and just, the removal could very well have been accomplished without 
war. In analyzing this and Walzer’s other arguments, Walzer seems to do well in 
discussing historical events but fails to produce a rubric by which to judge future events; 
specifically, Walzer fails in specificity of requirements for interventions; he is too broad 
and this is a component of the just war tradition that will be improved upon in the 
measurement criteria of this work.  
For now, Walzer’s lack of definitive clarity has a lot to do with the temporal 
factor of decision making in the present tense. For instance, the US decision to invade in 
Iraq was ostensibly based upon its possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I 
fear that Walzer’s ultimate conclusion that the US war was not justified is based more on 
the fact that WMD did not exist in the final analysis rather than the evidence that 
supported the presence of WMD. However, while he tentatively supported UN inspectors 
in Iraq, it is unclear whether he believed in the existence of WMDs as a material cause of 
war. Nevertheless, this is expounded upon further in the discussion of ‘enormous 
                                                 






evidence’ requirements within the measurement criteria. In short, while Walzer creates a 
compelling argument for the act of intervention in various cases, he fails to consider how 
intervention would play out in a state that is complicit in the act of terrorism. (Iraq would 
be an example of a complicit state while Afghanistan would be directly tied.) This 
deficiency is not resolved in Walzer’s later work but, in spirit, Walzer lays the necessary 
groundwork when he writes about the burden of proof lying with the state that intends to 
intervene in the affairs of another state. This too, shall serve as a jumping off point in the 
chapter on measurement criteria. 
The second area that Walzer discusses deals with what he calls the ‘war 
convention.’ This is not an actual legal convention, per se. It does not have formal 
signatories nor does it have the legal weight of a formal convention. Instead, Walzer’s 
war convention is made up of the norms, practices, traditions, and ideals that surround the 
international understanding of what is permissible and impermissible in the conduct of 
war.39  
 The first subject of discussion is non-combatant immunity. This is the principle 
that states that non-combatants can not be attacked at any time. Walzer states that non-
combatants cannot be attacked at any time although when fighting takes place in close 
proximity to non-combatants, the fighters shall take care in avoiding civilian casualties. 
Walzer goes further to lay out four principles whereby the killing of non-combatants is 
allowable. They are as follows: 
 
1. The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means, for our 
purposes, that it is a legitimate act of war. 






2. The direct effect is morally acceptable – the destruction of military 
supplies, for example, or the killing of enemy soldiers. 
3. The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the 
acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a 
means to his ends. 
4. The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the 
evil effect…40 
 
The fact that Walzer sees exceptions to the axiom of never killing non-combatants 
is a major strength in his arguments in the subject of immunities. By understanding that 
negative externalities are unavoidable in the reality of war, his argument is strengthened 
by these four clear cut qualifications.  
Next, Walzer describes a just response to terrorism in terms of identifying 
acceptable targets and combatants. For Walzer, once terrorists are identified, a state 
should surgically neutralize their threat proportionately and minimizing collateral 
damages in much the same way as humanitarian interventions; also, each action must be 
considered on a case by case basis, which is hardly surprising from a mechanical 
standpoint41 Also, action against terrorists should not carry the same burden as a court of 
law in terms of the permissibility of evidence.42 His argument is that it is unlikely that 
terrorists will have the same record keeping as the Nazis that played so heavily in the 
Nuremburg Trials and as such, no requirements should be imposed for jusdicially 
admissible evidence. This is a bit problematic since his definition is  so loose. I can 
foresee situations where evidence may be enough for one state while the international 
community may seem incredulous, e.g. the United States invasion of Iraq.  
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Also, Walzer notes that covert action is necessary although he punts on defending 
moral rules or even constructing arguments for covert action beyond assassination; 
Walzer is fine with assassination of terrorists because of the lack of a civil/military 
distinction.43 Unfortunately, Walzer cannot complete his arguments without discussing 
covert action since, as a practical matter, is a major component of any war on terror. As 
such, the subject of covert action is in desperate need of moral arguments for what is 
permissible and impermissible. I attempt to answer these questions later in the 
measurement criteria. 
 In summation, this literature review has been a presentation and critique of 
neoconservative perspectives and just war theory as they relate to the terrorism generally 
and the US war on terror specifically. To some extent, these two camps countervail 
between US national interests and generally accepted international laws and norms. The 
next chapter will draw on both the neoconservative and just war camps to create 
measurement criteria by which to judge the conduct of the US in its war on terror. 






Chapter 3: Measurement Criteria for the US War on Terror 
 
 
 The third chapter lays out the measurement criteria for the US war on terror by 
advocating a just war theory framework for actions and root-cause change. This includes 
an emphasis on using the tactical and strategic prongs together as a balanced relationship 
to provide a framework by which to judge the US war on terror in the fourth chapter case 
study. The tactical focuses on short term uses of military, covert, and financial tactics to 
confront terrorism while the strategic focuses on long-term changes in socio-political, 
economic, and religious relations.44 The criteria laid out in this chapter builds upon the 
just war tradition by looking at various components of action within tactical and strategic 
prongs.45  
 The criteria laid out in this chapter take the arcane and prosaic language of just 
war theory and puts the theory into clear and unambiguous categories for action that are 
relevant to individuals in a policy making capacity. Above all, I attempt to create 
language that is understood by all affected parties whether an academic, policy wonk, or 
warfighter.  
                                                 
44 The choice of language with regard to tactical and strategic is important. In the sphere of military 
operations, tactical and strategic are crudely analogous to short and long by a measure of distance, e.g. 
tactical attack aircraft vice strategic bombing aircraft. Likewise, in a time horizon sense, there are short 
terms tactics that compliment long term strategies. My definition focuses on the latter with a twist. The 
twist being that the aims of my tactical prong are different than at the strategic prong. This is typified by the 
US desire to hunt the terrorists of today (tactical prong initiative) while curbing the recruitment of terrorists 
for tomorrow (strategic prong initiative). However, while the temporal aims may be different, the overall 
normative goal is the eventual and permanent obsolescence of terrorism.  
45 The construction of the measurement criteria will rarely depart from just war rationales; however, when 





 This aim of this chapter is to create a framework for terror response in the short 
term while affecting root cause change in the long term. The goal of these measures is the 
containment of terrorism and then its eventual obsolescence.  
The criteria balance the jingoistic tendencies of reactionary responses against the 
‘turn the other cheek’ mantra of a pacifist. The chapter concludes with a discussion on 
permissibility of action and causality within the construct of the approach at both the 
tactical and strategic levels.  
The criteria are modeled on just war theory and provide concise inputs and 
outputs that act as triggers for action. In creating these triggers, an emphasis is drawn 
between the tactical and strategic spheres being used in concert for the greatest effect.46 
Using only a tactical approach would be analogous to a medical doctor treating only a 
symptom instead of the cause of an ailment. As a caveat to what is to follow, the 
measurement criteria is an affirmation of the overall framework of just war theory as 
much as it is a critique of current neoconservative policy means; at the same time, the 
criteria are meant as a sort of policy guidebook for individuals practically involved in the 
fight against terror. 
3.1 The Tactical Prong 
Tactical shall be defined as a procedure or set of maneuvers engaged in to achieve 
an end, an aim, or a goal from a short term point of view. From one standpoint, this 
action is permissible when cassus belli is present as well as very strict instances when 
cassus belli is implied, which will be discussed in detail later. The cause of action may 
only take place when such criteria are met, e.g. an attack on the homeland or a colossal 
                                                 





body of evidence from multiple sources that such an attack is imminent. This is to say 
that if one of the criteria is met, then a government is justified in proportional action. The 
question thus becomes, what sort of action does the tactical prong contemplate? The 
tactical considers the use of military, intelligence (covert) and financial tactics for the 
purposes of short-term goal seeking and immediate action. 
In order to discuss the methods by which a military, intelligence, or financial 
response may take place, it is important to consider certain scenarios to set the stage.  
An overt military response is permissible only within the construct of when action 
has been taken against a sovereign state that has caused material damage to one or more 
organs of that state, e.g. a bombing of a financial center, diplomatic outpost, a monument, 
etc.47 Once an attack takes place, this can be considered just cause for seeking redress 
through military means. Such military responses may include but are not limited to 
precise bombings, placing troops on foreign soils of those countries that house terrorists 
and, in very limited cases, affecting regime change with the sponsorship of an 
international coalition.  
However, in each case, the government must ensure that the cause of action is 
well laid out upon the ‘international stage’ (defined as the media and foreign 
governments). All military responses must be proportional and minimize collateral 
damage. For instance, if a sovereign has been attacked by a terrorist organization, then it 
might be apparent that an attack has taken place, like if a bomb were to explode in a busy 
subway station. Conversely, there may be instances where the evidence of an attack is 
                                                 
47 This comes under a category that one could call egregious acts against a sovereign. It is accepted fact in 
just war theory, international law, and prevailing norms that such acts, when unprovoked by similar 
military actions, are cause for war, e.g. the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the German occupations of France, 





less obvious, like if a cyber attack were to take place upon the information infrastructure 
of a state. In the less obvious cases, this would constitute an instance where a state would 
be obligated to provide enough transparency to show that indeed an attack has taken 
place and the damage, either real or intended, warrants action by that government upon 
the terrorist organization that launched the attack. This obligation shall be fulfilled out in 
the ‘open’ by allowing access to the evidence.48 However, if the details of the attack are 
sensitive in nature, e.g. they might expose some sort of threat to national technical 
means,49 then it is permissible for the attacked state to consult with foreign governments 
in order to meet their obligations. This is not to suggest that a government, if attacked by 
terrorists, must gain permission by international test. On the contrary, the intent of this 
obligation is to introduce transparency into a government’s terror response increasing 
awareness and accountability within the international community. A response to a 
terrorist attack need not be delayed in order for the attacked state to fulfill its obligation 
to explain its cause for action. The realities of timing in the use of force are a 
consideration in the employment of tactical military force. 
In addition, the attack must be proportional and just, which is to say that the 
indiscriminate killing of one state’s citizens does not give it the right to kill 
indiscriminately in retaliation.50 (The ‘Law of Hammurabi’ is clearly not justified.) As a 
corollary, collateral damage must also be minimized. This is to say that a government is 
                                                 
48 The chief reason that evidence is ‘open’ to the international community is one of transparency. Just as the 
legislative branch of the US government exercises its fiduciary and oversight responsibilities against 
executive departments and agencies, so too must the international community act in a quasi oversight 
capacity and agree when an attack has taken place. Some might be concerned over a sacrifice of 
sovereignty; to which I would reply that just as the executive branch remains the independent master of its 
decisions, so too does the attacked sovereign.  
49 This could be the proprietary intelligence gathering apparatus of the state, for instance. 
50 The notions of proportionality presented here are rooted in just war theory. However, the difference here 
is that while this may read like an instruction manual, the attempt is to remove ambiguity and grey areas 





not justified in casually risking civilian life in order to neutralize terrorists. The example 
of this would be a government is not justified in bombing an apartment complex filled 
with civilians only to kill a single apartment of terrorists. And while it is easy to write 
these axioms about what is permissible and what is impermissible for military action in 
the tactical prong; it is noted and understood that there exists a ‘fog of war’ in which 
decisions must be made with imperfect information. In those situations, this work does 
not offer any insight except to say that the permissibility of military action post terrorist 
attack must be made in an environment that respects the rules of war in a transparent and 
accountable manner. The decision making process must never use the tactics of the 
terrorists and should make decisions on the side of caution. A war of the just against 
terror attacks must be flexible enough to remember that while each attack should be 
treated equally, they need not be treated the same.51 
As a companion to military action, there are times when the subtlety of covert 
action is warranted. Covert action is defined action that is undertaken outside of the 
public view through clandestine means. This action does not normally employ the 
military organ of a government. Typically, covert action against a terrorist organization is 
taken at the direction of a head of state and carried out by that state’s intelligence 
community, e.g. the Central Intelligence Agency, et al in the United States or Military 
Intelligence Six in the United Kingdom, et cetera. The question becomes, under the 
                                                 
51 The idea of equal treatment not bearing the same treatment is an idea drawn from the equal protection 
clause of the 14th amendment. Just as affirmative action allows for unequal measures to create equal 
protection, i.e. a favoring of minorities in college applications, there is also a military analog in my 
argument. For instance, an individual that perpetrates an act of terror may become the target of a surgical 
air strike while another individual who has committed an identical act may be kidnapped and thus brought 
to justice in another way. What this shows the reader is very simple: Both terrorists have been treated 
equally, i.e. a wrong has been righted, although they were not treated the same. This allows the US 





tactical prong when is it just and permissible to employ the covert apparatus of a 
government? 
Covert action requires carefully weighed considerations on behalf of a 
government that seeks action. The guiding principles are as follows: First, it is assumed 
that covert action is taken as a method of surveillance where a government attempts to 
ascertain as much specific information as possible about a terrorist organization. This can 
be defined as passive intelligence seeking where the act of intelligence gathering does not 
actually affect the outcome of plans already set in motion by a terrorist organization.52 
The covert action tactical prong of this approach places no restriction on covert passive 
intelligence gathering and since passive covert action does no harm to a state’s 
sovereignty of territorial integrity, this is permissible within the framework of just war 
theory as well. 
What this approach contemplates is active covert intelligence tactics such as 
assassinations, interrogations, torture and other active means that, absent cassus belli, are 
currently without legal sanction within international law. Therefore, it is important to 
look at the set of conditions that must be present for active intelligence seeking to be 
permissible and, in increasing degrees, moral. 
When an enormous amount of evidence exists that a terrorist attack is imminent, 
then a government is authorized to use action or force in order to assuage that threat.53 
The shades of grey come in defining ‘enormous amount’ and ‘imminent.’ The danger 
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Such examples may include foreign eavesdropping or remote sensing.  Besides, a long description of 
passive covert action is probably otiose to this work insofar that the debate regarding the permissibility of 
passive covert means has remained relatively static in the security, legal or ethical sense over the past sixty 
some years. 
53 Even the United Nations Security Council appears to condone limited pre-emptive action if the measure 





here is that these terms are so malleable that a government may use them to suit any 
purpose or goal they wish to seek by doctoring their own definitions of what is enormous 
evidence or precisely how imminent is imminent? This work attempts to remedy the 
debate surrounding these definitions by offering the following precise definitions: 
Enormous amount is taken to mean evidence that is obtained from multiple sources and is 
verifiable through either independent means or upon analysis.54 What this shows is intent. 
Just as in criminal law, a suspect may be arrested and prosecuted for intent to commit 
murder. Therefore, if situations develop within the presence of enormous evidence, then 
an active covert action should be warranted. To do otherwise would be analogous to a 
police officer waiting for a murder to take place even though the signs and evidence 
existed to have reasonable assurances of the intent to commit the act of murder. In the 
international construct of government action against terrorist organizations, if a 
government were to not act against terrorism despite the presence of enormous evidence, 
then that government would be negligent in its moral obligation to protect and defend its 
citizenry. Again, the legalist paradigm is at work. 
This approach calls for a greater understanding to execute action in a preemptive 
manner when the causality of intent exists.55 This may seem a radical departure from the 
current construct of just war and international law. While just war theory allows for 
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or ‘multiple sources.’ The problem is one of quality and some sources and evidence are better than others. 
However, the superseding requirement shall be rooted in the need for independent analysis, which has the 
aim of validating not just an overall cause for action but has the responsibility to say yea or nay, this 
evidence and its sources satisfy a cause for action.  In short, evidence must be repeatable and reliable. 
55 Some might allege that the metaphor that compares domestic murder to international terrorism is weak 
because domestic politics allow for governing bodies and police forces, while the world, overall, is 
anarchic and has no international policing mechanism. To this, the author would reply that domestic 
structure in many countries provides successful means by which to prosecute based on intent; therefore, ‘a 
path of least resistance’ can be found in using domestic politics to answer some of the more irksome 





preemption in the manner I have laid out, the practical deliberations within the 
international community have placed severe restrictions on preemption. That said, 
preemption through active covert means has little oversight perhaps alleviating the broad 
litmus test of the international community instead favoring consultation with other 
branches of government.  Back to the legalist paradigm, in both common and civil law 
systems, judicial procedures allow for a charge of ‘intent’ to be levied against the 
accused, carrying much the same weight and penalty as the actual crime. Nevertheless, 
the domestic legal example only allows for so much comparison since it has inherent 
checks and balances between law enforcement, plaintiffs, defendants and magistrates. 
The case for active covert action is made within a single government acting as judge, 
jury, and executioner. So then, how can this moral quandary be alleviated? This approach 
proposes that the evidence that serves as justification for active covert action is checked 
in two ways: One, authorization for action should be granted at the highest level of the 
US government, i.e. the president. Two, an independent member of the judiciary should 
concur prior to the start of active covert action. These checks are in addition to whatever 
compulsory oversight that is already exercised by the legislative. What this serves to do is 
provide an appropriate level of checks and balances and a thorough decision making 
procedure. The aim is to allow a system that is flexible yet morally sound.  
Certain attention needs to be given to the definition of imminent. The term 
imminent means a time horizon that is so small as to not allow the minimum period in 
which to employ any other measures beside active covert action.56 This means that the 
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the state did nothing? If the answer is that citizens will be adversely affected in such a way that to ignore 
the situation would be analogous to a government reneging upon its social contract, then a state has no 





information showing causality threatens to result in material harm upon a state if active 
covert action is not undertaken immediately and that no time exists to remedy the 
situation in a less abrasive manner. For instance, if an attack could be thwarted through 
negotiation, diplomacy, or third party intervention, then the attack would not be 
considered imminent and, therefore, it would not provide appropriate causality for active 
covert action. 
In a discussion of morality in active covert action, it is important to look at the 
ways in which action may manifest itself; namely in the form of assassination, 
kidnappings, interrogations and torture. Assassination without legal trial is exceedingly 
difficult to justify even under the gravest of threats and even in the presence of enormous 
evidence and imminent attack. Therefore, this approach advocates the judicious use of 
assassination absent traditional cassus belli in the most extreme instances where there is 
enormous evidence of an imminent threat present. While assassination is tantamount to a 
slippery slope, the hands of leaders protecting their citizenry cannot be tied for lack of 
traditional cassus belli. The stakes are simply too high. Just as killing is permissible in 
traditional just war, so must assassination of terrorist leaders and terrorist combatants in 
any pronounced war on terror.57 
However, assassination should be treated as a method of last resort held only after 
such options as capture and kidnapping have been considered or employed. Assassination 
must not be the first option because the loss of human life should not be taken lightly. It 
is important to remember that the fight against terror may be viewed within the context of 
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sometimes when it is necessary. Throughout this section, I categorize instances when permissibility should 





right versus wrong. In a government’s attempt to combat terror with active covert action, 
that government must not resort to using terror tactics itself.58 
Pretend that in the presence of enormous evidence and imminent attack, a 
president has authorized with judicial concurrence, the capture/kidnapping of terrorist-
combatants that are directly involved in an attack plot. What can that government morally 
do with the captured combatants? Interrogation of the subjects is permissible under the 
charge of intent as previously outlined and defended. The provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions should be upheld even if the governance of the Conventions is not 
acknowledged by the government. Similarly, the climate for interrogation should be set in 
such a way as to provide for the humane and ethical treatment of the individuals that have 
been captured and detained. The act of torture is the fodder that terror supporters expect, 
which is to say that terror organizations expect the captured to be tortured and beaten. To 
provide for the ethical and humane treatment of the captured is to provide for a situation 
that will not meet the expectations of the captured or their supporters.59 A government 
must not lose its position or presumption of morality since that degrades the 
government’s position to a stance that is akin to that of the terrorist. 
This discussion on the permissibility of covert action goes a step further to 
provide detailed instructions to bridge the gap between approach and practice.60 Active 
covert action is permissible after having satisfied the triggers of enormous evidence and 
                                                 
58 To use terror to fight terror creates the further proliferation of the immorality of terror. No matter how 
grave the situation, to lose the ‘high ground,’ to borrow a phrase, is not only tragic but it is morally 
reprehensible. 
59 The importance of which is further elucidated in the Strategic Prong during a discussion of root-cause 
change. 
60 Active covert action is one of the largest grey areas in just war theory. In practical terms, it is a necessary 
evil that is not discussed. However, this discussion tries to draw out a codified description of actions that 
are moral and ethical based loosely on just war theory but more on a utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian notion 
is that the covert action while somewhat distasteful in its crass methods of kidnapping, etc., is nevertheless 





imminent threat. This is a central strength of the tactical prong and provides significant 
improvement over other actionable approaches on how a government ought to deal with 
terrorism. The next section discusses ways in which to financially isolate terrorist 
organizations in the tactical prong. 
The world requires financial capital in order to operate. All business undertaken is 
conducted at some transactional level that exchanges goods and services, often in the 
form of currency. The business of terrorism is no different. A terrorist organization relies 
upon the free flow of capital in order to finance its operations. When currency fails to 
meet their needs, then the system of barter suffices. 
This section discusses ways in which a government might restrict the flow of 
capital to terrorist organizations in a just and moral way within the tactical prong of these 
measurement criteria.61 This is discussed in the three very basic areas of donations, 
banking, and capital flows.  
Morality and ethics are seldom discussed in terms of how to isolate a terrorist 
organization financially. From a business perspective, recent scandals in the West have 
given credence to the ethical conduct of business leaders and those with fiduciary 
responsibilities to shareholders. It is the contention of this argument that a government 
that is attempting to financially isolate a terrorist organization has a moral, ethical and 
fiduciary responsibility to the marketplace to isolate only the capital that can be directly 
                                                 
61 Here again, just war theory is silent on financial measures that can be used to wage traditional war, let 
alone a war on terror. (It is noted that just war theory does consider the bombing of factories and means of 
war production.) I believe this section is a major improvement from the tactical perspective in terms of 
categorizing what is permissible and impermissible in the financial sense. Indeed, the proliferation of the 
internet, e-commerce, and globalization has changed the ways in which financial capital markets function 
in their most basic sense. Any war against terror (or its measurement criteria in this instance) must 
contemplate not just the labor side of equation, but also the flow of capital. This section contemplates 
measurement criteria for the means by which capital flows at the current state of technology; the argument 





linked to real or intentional acts of terrorism. This duty to leave the marketplace as 
unfettered as possible has to do with strict due diligence which must take place so that 
other markets are not disrupted by the activity to financially isolate the terror 
organization. 
Like in the hitherto section on military response, a government must either make 
its case for financial isolation either to the media or in close consultation with other 
sovereign governments. The goal is transparency in the process and while ends should be 
identified, it is not presumed to be necessary that a government divulge its means or 
methods.62 The case for financial isolation of a terrorist organization is much more 
defined once a terrorist organization has carried out an attack; in which case a 
government is well within its right to financially isolate the attacking organization. 
However, what one needs to consider is when action is permissible in the face of a 
perceived threat. In this case, the just options are as follows: 
The government may seek to degrade the funding of the terrorist organization, 
usually by blocking donations. This can be moderately difficult to accomplish, since it 
will require banking forensics to trace the capital flows to the terrorist organization. 
However, since the goal of a terrorist organization is to limit the liberty of individuals 
through terror tactics and donations to aid terrorist organization ought to be viewed as 
attempts to degrade liberty within society. Therefore, it is just to restrict donations or 
funding to terrorist organizations through restrictive financial tactics. 
A government is well within its rights to appeal to banking and financial 
institutions to freeze the assets of capital being held by terrorist organizations. A bank is 
                                                 





often the intermediary node between the terrorist and the funding source. By limiting 
access to banks, this will greatly degrade the funding network for various terror 
organizations; this may even include the permanent seizure of assets attributable to 
terrorists. 
The basic flow of capital to terrorists must be slowed as much as possible for 
without capital their intentions will become impotent. This will allow the terrorist 
organization to become further isolated and reduce the threat they may pose.  
As a final caveat, the degradation of the financial infrastructure for a terrorist 
organization can only be so effective. For instance, bombs are relatively cheap to make 
and only require a moderate level of skill and an entire large-scale terrorist operation can 
be launched for only a few hundred thousand dollars. However, this should not dissuade 
governments from isolating terror funding in order to assuage the attempt of terrorists to 
carry out an attack.63 
The beauty of the option of financial isolation with the tactical prong is that it is 
non-violent in nature and can achieve the goal of ‘softening’ terrorist organizations 
before any other action is necessary. This is very much the same way a military in war 
might conduct an air campaign in order to pave the way for ground forces in a later stage. 
Financial isolation reduces the overall vitality of the organization, paving the way to 
extinguish the terrorist threat in later stages. 
In conclusion of the tactical prong, the three basic areas of concentration through 
military response, covert action and financial isolation allow for immediate responses to 
terrorist organizations once they have attacked or if they threaten to attack. This has 
                                                 
63 Further, while degradation of a terrorist’s financial means might not serve as a deathblow to its 
organization, the hope is that a convergence of many factors, e.g. military, covert and financial, will all lead 





focused on the ethical and moral methods of action in each instance. However, the 
tactical prongs will never be capable of focusing anything other than the short term. If a 
government finds itself considering one of the tactical prong tools, then chances are they 
have already lost. The true win set within governmental responses to terrorism lies not 
within the construct of tactical action; but instead through the strategic ability to affect 
root-cause changes. To follow now is the cornerstone and the greatest hope for the future 
of this work. It is the strategic prong. 
3.2 The Strategic Prong 
The strategic prong emphasizes the long-term time horizon with plans based upon 
social change and relations at the individual unit level. The penultimate goal of the 
strategic prong is to treat the causes of terrorism. The ultimate goal of the strategic prong 
is to affect change at the individual unit level leading to the obsolescence of terrorism. 
The strategic prong is the measurement criteria for confronting the values that are 
present or absent in certain societies that have set conditions for terrorism. The strategic 
prong uses methods for peaceful change.  
The three sections that are discussed in the strategic prong are socio-political, 
economic, and religious.64 The discussion on the socio-political is one of social 
interaction among the body politic and basic rights. The economic is a discussion of both 
public and private development, investment, and justice through wealth distribution. The 
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sociological study; these three categories are the areas that I believe are the most relevant in terms of 
affecting root cause change. One could make an argument that one might be more important than another. 
However, it is my belief that the convergence of these three pillars of sociology provides the basis for 
fundamental root cause change in individuals, groups, societies, governments, etc. The measurement 
criteria for the strategic prong is very much a bottoms up method that draws initially upon individuals that 





religion section is a discussion of common tenets in world religion, condemnations of 
extremism and separations of church and state as organs of society. 
The discussion of the socio-political may divided into two areas of domestic and 
foreign societies.65 The domestic is the society of the country that is seeking to affect 
root-cause change in order to assuage the threat of terrorism. The foreign society is the 
societies of other states and geographic regions that are one of the targets of the root-
cause change that is attempted by government action. 
The societal portion of the strategic prong is an attempt at long run social change 
with an emphasis on inter-state and inter-societal relations. This stratagem is undertaken 
by a state government and is therefore operating in the political organ of a society. The 
actions of that government are taken in the interests of justice, toleration and openness. 
This will be shown first in the domestic sense and then in the international sense by 
showing how a government through measured action can affect root-cause changes in 
order to limit the likelihood of terrorist activity. 
With an emphasis on toleration at the domestic level, the US government ought to 
provide equal protection under the law and to legislate tolerance through codified 
infractions such as hate-crime laws and equal opportunity acts. It is not enough to create 
laws that individuals must follow but the citizens must view the laws as just. Therefore, a 
government must foster a spirit of tolerance amongst its citizenry in order to have a 
decent, moral, just society. In order to accomplish this, the government must allow for 
certain social welfare to occur, e.g. funding of arts programs, affirmative action, and civic 
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here for synergies sake. After all if ‘main is a political animal,’ then the though process should be clear. 
Also, politics is but a different level of social behavior, which further explains why the social and political 





involvement at the community level. If this seems a bit nebulous, that is because it is. The 
domestic understanding of how to affect social constructs at the root level is further 
expounded in the subsequent discussions of economics and religion. They are intimately 
intertwined with this discussion of root cause change at the domestic socio-political level. 
In terms of foreign policy, a government that wishes to affect change at the root-
cause level in a foreign society is left with two options for furthering an emphasis on 
tolerance abroad. A government may either show foreign cultures that the society of that 
government is indeed just; or it can show emphasis on the virtues of a tolerant culture to a 
society abroad that may be less that tolerant. For instance, the government may choose 
several media choices by buying airtime to advertise or putting individuals in the home 
country on local media programming, or even a show of ‘good faith,’ e.g. nothing did 
more for early Franco-American relations than the gift of the Statue of Liberty.66 The 
basic tool of a government wishing to affect opinion and attempt root-cause change in a 
foreign country is to create a concerted diplomatic and media campaign to create positive 
change over time. This process is slow and often arduous. Progress is measured over a 
long time horizon instead of the short time horizon.  
Also, a government may attempt to show that tolerance is a laudable quality in a 
foreign country. This is a scenario where it is very important for the government taking 
action to tread lightly and not offend the culture they are attempting to influence. In a 
situation like this, a government should attempt to influence culture and society in the 
foreign land through cultural exchange, diplomacy and public relations. By cultural 
exchange it means that exchanges should be made between the different societies; e.g. a 
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conference of cultural elites, etc. The ultimate goal is the ability to raise awareness of the 
dissimilar and to show that while different, there are many common traits through all 
societies. In the subject of diplomacy, both countries should attempt to find common 
ground in which to show diplomatically that the goals of the two countries are aligned 
however broadly. Finally, through public relations, a government wishing to show an 
emphasis on toleration may wish to advertise in the local media of another society in 
order to show that tolerance is a praiseworthy goal.67  
In regions that have acted as a cradle to terror, there exists a preponderance of 
hate, deceit, and racism that preaches a belief that oneself is superior to another. Over 
time, a concerted effort can be made to make these cultures tolerant at the societal level; 
then the fight for justice, tolerance and openness will be a step closer to fruition.  
 In terms of consideration for democracy, a few thoughts need to be considered: 
First, this work does not make a value judgment that democracy is the best form of 
government in order to create a society that is just. It is the opinion of this work that 
democratization should not be a primary tool of fighting terrorism as proffered by so 
many neo-conservatives. This section should serve as a warning to governments that 
believe democratization will solve terror problems in a region.68 The argument is that 
creating a democracy with universal suffrage overnight will most certainly create a 
tyranny of the majority by which a portion of a society’s minority will become 
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subjugated.69 A government trying to affect change in a region that is known to be a 
cradle of terrorism, ought to be concerned with strengthening institutions in that region 
through an emphasis of the primacy of law, a separation of church and state, and social 
welfare. Strengthened institutions and basic rights will help affect changes in the society 
of a region.  
 A US government attempting to affect change should make their overall focus on 
securing basic rights, ensuring liberties, and a clear delineation of specific duties within a 
society in order to protect those rights and liberties. Building institutions that will 
preserve as well as protect and defend the liberties of the individuals within a respective 
society ought to be the primary goal before democratization. This will create a just form 
of government, founded in openness and toleration. While this government may be 
democracy, it does not matter so long as it is a form of government that ensures pervasive 
justice. 
 In sum, the US government must make emphasis on change at the socio-political 
level in regions or states that it believes to have conditions conducive to terrorist 
organizations or terrorist recruiting. This may be accomplished by a willingness to make 
a profound emphasis over the long run on toleration, institution building, and helping 
regions and states understand the importance of basic rights, liberties and duties as 
fundamental to the creation of just societies that can free themselves from the conditions 
that create terror. 
The following section on economy is a dialogue concerning public/private 
development, investment, and justice through measures of wealth distribution. The area 
                                                 





of public development use measurements derived from the role of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank to stem the tide of terrorism. The area of private 
development will discuss various definitions in which to measure return on investment, 
return on capital and ethical business practices. Finally, a third section will deal with state 
centric behavior regarding income distributions. 
Economy is one of the contributing factors that cause terrorism. Those living in 
economically undesirable states often seek redress through violent means in order to right 
a perceived wrong. Say there is a country that is run in oligopolistic fashion whereby the 
economic wealth of the state is enjoyed by very few within the state or is enjoyed by 
investment firms outside the state. This may breed hate and discontent over the long term 
thereby setting the necessary conditions in which terrorism may flourish. The basic 
argument is gross economic inequality is a condition by which terrorism shall flourish.  
How can a government affect change in a country or a region through economic means? 
A government may affect change in a country or region economically by focusing 
on public development and investment institutions such as the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions possess tremendous bargaining 
power in order to help or fund the efforts of states. The IMF itself, along with its 
Washington Consensus, provides nations with a strict blueprint for liberal economic 
reforms.70 A government wishing to affect change in a region of the world that provides 
conditions for terrorism may use the IMF as an intermediary in order to help with 
macroeconomic reforms within a country. In terms of development, the World Bank is 
tremendous tool that can help a country diversify and stabilize its society and economy. 
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World Bank programs might include investing in a states infrastructure in order to 
improve its roads, water, or electrical grid. It may also help its citizens learn to diversify 
their economy so they are no longer reliant upon single revenue economies, e.g. oil in 
much of the Middle East or poppy in Afghanistan. A government is well within its rights 
to form ad hoc strategic partnerships with the IMF and World Bank in order to help 
assuage economic disparities that may occur in countries that are ‘more prone’ to terrorist 
activities. By creating stability in sound liberal macroeconomic policies and basic 
infrastructure through economic development, public institutions along with governments 
have the ability to create meaningful change in regions.  
Second, a government wishing to affect economic change in a country or region 
may wish to do so through the private sector. This may be accomplished by encouraging 
foreign direct investment71 and in emphasizing ethical business conduct. For foreign 
direct investment, the notion is that economies that are inequitable, thus setting certain 
conditions that breed terrorism, are often underdeveloped. Therefore, the encouragement 
of the right kinds of foreign direct investment will help alleviate the conditions of 
terrorism. Foreign direct investment is when a firm sets up either a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or a licensing agreement in a host country in order to take advantage of factor 
endowments that that state may possess. What foreign direct investment allows is the 
diffusion of capital into the host country, which helps to employ the local workforce and 
raise the standard of living in the host country. Unfortunately, foreign direct investment 
often causes a parasitic relationship between a corporation and the economy of the host 
country. In order to diminish this problem, firms that undertake foreign direct investment 
                                                 





strategies must engage in the ethical conduct of business. From a government’s 
perspective, this will provide conditions whereby the economic plight of a country or 
region can be improved through foreign direct investment strategies. This may be 
accomplished by the home country’s government requiring the use of minimal benefits 
within the working environment of the host country. This may also include a minimum 
wage, health care, pension, etc. In order to act justly and ethically, a firm must not engage 
in a purely profit-seeking parasitic relationship with a country that will only breed hate 
and discontent toward the home country.  
A historical example of this would be late colonial Britain and the parasitic 
relationship between the trading and holding companies and the regions that they 
exploited, e.g. India, Pakistan, et cetera. This relationship festered and directly caused the 
retaliation of the indigenous population against citizens of the United Kingdom that 
resided in the region.72 
 A state must encourage and require firms based in the state to act justly and 
morally in order to allow stable economies to flourish. To some critics this is analogous 
to filing for non-profit status. However, firms have a responsibility to their customers and 
stockholders to act both morally and ethically when doing business at home and abroad. 
Within the context of executing a fight to curtail terrorism, a state has an obligation to 
ensure that firms acting in the marketplace are not acting unjustly so as to exacerbate 
conditions of terrorism. 
 In addition, the distribution of income within states is of particular importance. In 
general, it can be shown that states that produce a highly concentrated distribution of 
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income will be more likely to have a population that is prone to terrorism or violence. A 
state that wishes to affect change upon another state that it deems likely to produce 
terrorism should look at the distribution of wealth within that state. If the distribution is 
highly concentrated, then the government should urge the other government to undertake 
social welfare programs in order to create a more equitable distribution of income, or at 
bare minimum, ensure that a state’s citizens are not left in poverty. 
 To sum up the economic arguments of the strategic prong, it can be understood in 
the following example: A state sees another state that it views as being a place where the 
growth of terrorism is likely since the state is what can be termed as economically 
disadvantaged.73 The characteristics of this state include its concentration of wealth 
confined to a very small portion of its citizens, an economy based upon a very limited 
range of products or services, firms investing in the country are engaged in parasitic 
practices because they are taking advantage of low wages with no benefits within the 
workforce, and the system of trade between the disadvantaged state and the state wishing 
to affect change is protectionist in nature. The just and ethical treatment of one state 
wishing to affect change in another state would include working with the IMF, World 
Bank as well as other investment and development agencies in order to help diversify the 
economy while building its infrastructure. It would also require that firms engaged in 
foreign direct investment to provide a certain livable wage with benefits; and setting up 
inducements that will lead to a better distribution of wealth. 
This system of economic change will eventually help create a society within a 
state that is based upon moral and ethical duties whereby each citizen is treated equally 
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and fairly in the economic sense, which will lead to a net reduction in the likelihood of 
that society nurturing terrorist organizations.  
Next, is religion under the strategic prong. Why is religion so important in terms 
of affecting root-cause change in the strategic prong? The answer lies in history:74 Many 
of the great wars throughout the written history of humanity have been fought over 
religion. Whether between Moses and the Pharaoh, the Crusades of the Middle Ages, the 
Final Solution a la Adolf Hitler, wars between India and Pakistan, the Arab-Israeli Wars 
of 1967 and 1972, the United States versus Islamic Extremism in relation to Al Qaeda 
and the list goes on. These are a few examples of major conflict that has been fought with 
an ostensible objective of religion in mind. Despite possessing common roots, the major 
religions of the world are often at odds with one another.  
The question is why are these major religions so conflicted despite their common 
roots? The answer to this is not an easy one but it is an extension of the dichotomous 
relationships that helps to define humanity. Individuals tend to define themselves against 
another creating a dualism, based upon what we are and often, what we are not.  
This relationship of dualism creates a sense that the dissimilar or that which one is 
not, is intrinsically different. While these views are easy to assess and quantify (“if it is 
not like me, then it must be this…”); these are views that often serve to breed distrust 
from those that are not like oneself. In the same way that an investment banker in a three 
piece suit assumes that a mechanic in oil stained coveralls cannot possibly relate; so is the 
                                                 





relationship between a Christian and a Muslim, or a Hindu and a Muslim, or a Hebrew 
and a Palestinian.75 
Instead of seeing what they have in common, they only see what is different. 
Instead of seeing individuals that all come from a mother and father and common social 
underpinnings, they see only different clothes, different languages and different food 
preferences. Religion and the moral ethic that it breeds is a very powerful tool for change 
within these constructs.  
This religious discussion shows how a government that wishes to employ the 
religious options set forth in the strategic prong may help religious institutions affect root 
cause change. The section on tolerance will explore the common tenets and historical 
foundations found in the Christian Bible, the Jewish texts (Talmud and Torah), and the 
Islamic Koran. The section on the separation of church and state will discuss the religious 
implication of instances when religion interferes with the organs of the political state. The 
final section will discuss religious extremism and what states and religious institutions 
can hope to accomplish. 
To say that religions, despite common beliefs and historical ties, are intolerant of 
one another would be a gross understatement. In fact, two of the largest religious 
traditions in the world, Christianity and Islam possess the same creation story and the 
same primogeniture for their respective races. It is worth remembering that two major 
cultures that seem so diametrically conflicted, share very common beginnings. This 
concerns almost two-thirds of the world’s religions through Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism. 
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A government may rightly and justly encourage religions to reach out across 
boundaries in the attempt to foster religious exchange and tolerance. A model for this can 
be the recent discussions between the Holy Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern 
Orthodox Church. These discussions have helped to mend a thousand-year-old schism 
between these two religions. Amongst the many breakthroughs in these discussions, 
Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic members may receive communion in each other’s 
churches, which is tantamount to saying that these two religions share very common roots 
and beliefs. Also, Pope John Paul II was able to end centuries of church sanctioned anti-
Semitism by reaching out to Jewish leaders around the world. The understanding and 
mending of cultural and religious divides between other world religions might not be as 
insurmountable as some might think given dedicated leadership. 
A government can encourage religious leaders to speak to other religious leaders 
in order to create a system that preaches inter-faith tolerance.76 This may be 
accomplished by allowing for budget allocations to aid in cultural exchange between 
religious leaders. The point is that the more interactions that occur between the leaders of 
religious institutions, the more tolerance will steep through what divides these religions. 
In time, joint research between major religions in text interpretation, theological study, or 
even archaeological excavation will serve as major breakthroughs and will move 
intolerant religions to the domain of gains. If religious leaders themselves are becoming 
understanding and tolerant this will diffuse religious toleration down through their 
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congregations, thus allowing for openness and toleration to provide a culture of change 
and alleviating issues in regions where religious intolerance had previously served as an 
incubator for terrorism.  
Also, there are universal tenets that occur across all religions like honoring ones 
father and mother, a prohibition against killing except in extreme instances and honoring 
thy neighbor etc. This ought to be treated in companion with the historical underpinnings 
that tend to link all the major world religions. From these common tenets, one can begin 
to create moral arguments for what can be considered right and wrong in a universal 
sense. Thus by introducing universal morals and ethics, one is able to appeal on moral 
and ethical grounds in order to further a concept of justice as measured in toleration and 
openness. The increased discourse that can be had by the realization of common religious 
underpinning (both in terms of beliefs and history) is able to help so-called dissimilar 
cultures discover that what they have in common often outweighs that which makes them 
different.77 
In coordination with preaching a just notion of tolerance between religions, it is 
important for governments to understand that church and state must act as separate 
organs of discourse within a society. Specifically, a state should never have a religious 
influence because that influence affects the primacy of law, sovereignty, and leads to 
conflicting interests that may breed terrorism. Imagine a situation where a state is run by 
a religion. First, the laws of the state will be replaced by religious rule, which has two 
problems. The first of which is that religious law is not sufficiently codified so as to 
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provide remedy for all social grievances; and second, the law of religious texts has no 
means to amend;’ it only has a means to interpret causing some laws which are 
antiquated, to seem Draconian if followed to the letter. The primacy of law over religion 
is important because the law is ultimately representative of a society and culture. The law 
provides methods for adaptability where a religion takes a much more historical 
approach. A religion’s beliefs and tenets can hold true over thousands of years but its 
adaptability as a governing institution leaves much to be desired Secondly, when a 
religion governs a state, there are issues of sovereignty that ultimately arise. The 
Anglican Church’s break from the Catholic Church (while ostensibly regarding King 
Henry VIII desire to divorce) is generally considered to be England’s wish to assert its 
unequivocal sovereignty. In short, a government wishing to affect change in a region 
should encourage the political leadership of a state to keep the affairs of the state 
formally separate from the affairs of the religious community in order to further good 
governance and toleration. 
Finally, religions and states need to commit to a firm and unequivocal 
condemnation of religious extremism. It can be written that states do a decent job of 
denouncing religious extremism but the leadership of religions is, in many cases, 
negligent in denouncing religious extremism. A state that wishes to stem the tide of 
religious extremism must be committed to a policy that attempts to have religious leaders 
condemned for tacitly encouraging fanatical acts. This will allow a peaceful and tolerant 
culture to grow over time. A religion must always preach passive means in which to 





dangerous and slippery slope where conventional moral ethics are simply explained away 
or justified for the cause of religious justification. 
In concluding this discussion on religious implications for root cause change, a 
government must work in concert with religious institutions in order to lessen or lighten 
the cultural divides that occur between the religions of the world. By emphasizing 
toleration by analysis of the common tenets and of religious texts, the separation of the 
organs of church and state, and a condemnation of extremism by both political and 
religious leaders; will create a culture within societies that lead to conditions whereby 
terrorism will no longer be a viable population within a society or state. 
In conclusion of the strategic prong, the three basic areas of concentration through 
socio-political, economy, and religion allow for long term responses to affect root cause 
change within regions or states. Throughout the elucidation of the strategic prong of this 
approach, there is an overarching concern to produce moral and ethical responses that 
lead to the indoctrination of moral and ethical behavior within all societies. It has been 
previously mentioned that the strategic prong is the best hope for the future and that still 
holds true. Long-term change takes time, a long time, and results are sometimes years in 
the making but the prudent steps of the strategic prong will only help if employed 
morally and ethically by a government wishing to affect root cause change.  
The first years of the twenty-first century has witnessed a growing concern over 
global terrorist insurgency and in no greater way is this insurgency personified than by 





observing constitutes a paradigm shift in international relations.78 To be certain, the threat 
of asymmetric action (i.e. terrorism) will continue to be a major policy issue for decades 
to come. The next chapter of this work will provide a case study of an actual war on 
terror and how that government has confronted the threat of terrorism. This case will 
serve as an evaluation point in which to apply the measurement criteria against the US 
war on terror. 
 
                                                 






Chapter 4: Case Study: The US War on Terror from Al Qaeda 
to Iraq 
 
This chapter lays out a case with which to evaluate real life events against 
measurement criteria from the previous chapter. The case chosen will discuss the United 
States war on terror against Al Qaeda and the later invasion of Iraq. The case will begin 
in the early 1990’s, run through early 2005 and give analysis from varied actors. The Al 
Qaeda and Iraq perspectives include discussions on oppression and tyranny through 
social, political and economic measures; while the United States perspective includes a 
discussion of their position within international law and sovereignty. A third perspective 
includes the so-called world perspective of various semi-exogenous actors that have 
indirectly been involved in the United States war on terror.79 Next, the case analyzes 
current governmental responses by the United States as employed from the neo-
conservative slant by the current United States government. This analysis serves to ‘set 
the stage’ in order to evaluate the case against the measurement criteria. Several 
recommendations are made in order to aid in correcting actions that are inconsistent with 
those criteria.  
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4.1 On History 
History gives a sense of perspective and is important when looking at this account 
of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization and its enigmatic leader, Osama Bin Laden. There 
are some that would say that Al Qaeda became a terrorist organization in 1998 when it 
issued a fatwa, effectively a declaration of war asking all Muslims to wage war against 
the West. Bin Laden and his deputies went further a few months later to say that 
Americans should be a primary target of violence because of their heavy involvement in 
the affairs of the Middle East.80 Al Qaeda believed their cause was just because they were 
justified by their religion despite none of its leadership coming from Islamic clergy. 
Further, Al Qaeda gave three ostensible reasons for the war against America. These are: 
The United States support of Israel, the United States close relationship with the Saudi 
royal family, and the United States embargo against Iraq.81 To Al Qaeda, this amounted 
to one overarching reason, which is United States involvement in the Arab Muslim 
world. Al Qaeda believed that the United States had economically and politically 
shackled the governments of the Middle East and were vehemently worried about 
‘impure’ Western influences. Al Qaeda viewed all of this as an affront to the sovereign 
right of the Arab Muslim world as well as the Islamic population throughout the world.82 
While Al Qaeda has planned many attacks against United States targets both 
within its borders and without, the three attacks worth mentioning are the United States 
Embassy bombings in East Africa during August 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 
Yemen during 2000, and the events of September 11, 2001 with attacks against the World 
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Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Virginia. These three attacks represent 
the greatest terrorist damage ever inflicted upon the United States in both isolated terms 
and in the aggregate.83  
These three events occurred within ten years of the end of the Cold War. These 
times are marked by the decrease of United States diplomatic presence worldwide, 
declining intelligence budgets for the clandestine services, a stagnation of military 
procurement, and the failure to recruit professionals to stem the tide of retirements within 
the intelligence, defense and diplomatic communities.84 
The point being that in a time where threats to the United States were moving 
from bi-polar relations to a highly fractured environment of shifting threats, Al Qaeda 
was able to capitalize on the devolved United States security posture, and was thus 
successful in launching these attacks which were, by many accounts either actively 
supported by Middle Eastern populations or tacitly condoned.85 But as important as this is 
from a tactical triage perspective, the attacks or how they were allowed is not really 
salient.  
One important question is why Middle Eastern populations reacted to these 
attacks with tacit approval. To understand this one must look in detail at a few events in 
the life and actions of Osama Bin Laden and then at United States Influence in the 
Middle East. 
Osama Bin Laden’s life is well documented and this work will add nothing to the 
material facts of his life. Although, for the purposes of later evaluation against the 
measurement criteria, it is important to examine a few events in the life of Al Qaeda’s 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pantagon’s New Map. New York. 2004. 





leader. First, Bin Laden as a young man traveled to Afghanistan where he took part in the 
decade long struggle to liberate that country from Soviet control. The struggle was 
defined in the terms of jihad or holy war; it was a struggle to expel an invader; it was a 
struggle to maintain the sovereignty of a nation of Muslims.86 In basic terms, Bin Laden 
showed up in Afghanistan in 1980 to help logistically fight a war of religion against an 
infidel invader. This acts as one of the first instances where we can see Bin Laden acting 
out of some sort of religious duty, albeit in a militant fashion. It is important to note here 
that for as religiously extreme as Bin Laden is, he is equally an adept leader, recruiter, 
and field commander, the concert of which has created a very potent threat in Al Qaeda.87  
At the close of the struggle for Afghan independence from the Soviets in 1989, Bin 
Laden turned his religiously fervent character to a much larger worldview. 
Bin Laden learned in his twenties and early thirties that Islam found it aberrant to 
allow infidels to control regions of the Middle East and these infidels should not exercise 
any influence over the vestiges of Islam. Further, he learned the mechanics of terror, of 
bomb making, of recruitment and of attack execution. He believed that his religion 
justified the means so long as the ends were noble.88 It is hardly surprising that Bin Laden 
would look at the political and economic interests of the United States in the Middle East 
and view them as an affront to Islam. The fait accompli was the United States led 
Operation Desert Shield and later Desert Storm that aimed at removing Iraqi forces from 
an occupied Kuwait that started with building a massive invasion force on Saudi Arabian 
soil.89 The fact that such a number of infidel soldiers would be allowed to amass in the 
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country of Islam’s most holy cities while preparing for a war against a neighboring 
country of Muslims, coupled with the later economic sanctions against the despotic Iraqi 
government, was simply too much for Bin Laden. Something had to be done and he had 
all the tools he needed: He had learned them in Afghanistan fighting the Soviets. Only 
this time the fight would take place on a global scale in a fashion the world had never 
before experienced. 
However, from a United States perspective, their interest in the Middle East was 
starkly different from how Osama Bin Laden had perceived it. To follow is the extent to 
the United States involved itself in the political, economic and military affairs of the 
Middle East.  
In political terms, the United States has a heavy involvement in the state of Israel 
for the purpose of supporting the region’s only democracy, which is one of the major 
aims of United States foreign policy. Further, the United States provides billions of 
dollars in foreign aid through its Agency for International Development, primarily being 
paid to the states of Israel and Egypt. 
In economic terms, United States businesses are heavily involved in terms of 
foreign direct investment mostly in the energy sector, specifically in resource extraction 
of crude oil. This has led to allegations of capital flight from some countries that have 
also affected the distribution of wealth in the Middle East. In this regard, the lines 
between political influence and economic influence become more or less blurred. On one 
hand, the United States government is protecting the interest of its private businesses, 
which are at best, profit-maximizing. On the other hand, the social economic state of the 





image of the United States businesses engaged in Middle Eastern operations. In effect, 
this has created a double-edged sword for American business and diplomacy in the 
Middle East. 
Finally, the United States military has been engaged in operations across the 
Middle East. The United States Navy has a fleet command headquartered in Yemen, 
major military exercises are held in Egypt every year, and the United States Air Force 
bases operations out of Turkey and Kuwait. In addition to overt military presence, the 
United States, through commercial and foreign military sales, has allowed the purchases 
of advanced military hardware, training and support services to various states in the 
Middle East, provided that they do not act against United States diplomatic aims. 
In addition, the United States has had an influence and continues to cultural 
influence the Middle East by providing university level education to Middle Easterners in 
the United States. These individuals bring views of the United States back to their home 
country. In societies which are largely closed to outside influence, like the Middle East, 
instances of interaction with local populations often serve as cases of first impression 
whereby individuals have a built in perception of the United States regardless of ever 
having any direct interaction. The expectation of Middle Easterners is that the United 






4.2 Individual Actor Perspectives 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the individual actor perspectives in terms 
of their external policies toward one another.90 Also discussed are the motivations of Al 
Qaeda and the United States from which one can discern the beliefs that each actor is 
following within its own external policies.  
The perspective of Al Qaeda will be discussed according to constructs of 
oppression and tyranny that it perceives itself to be combating.91 This oppression and 
tyranny is discussed in social, economic and political terms ultimately showing the 
reasons and justifications, in Al Qaeda’s terms, of why their terrorist actions are justified. 
A second section is a discussion of the perspective of the United States and how it 
perceives its interests in the Middle East. Going further to show how it perceives Al 
Qaeda in a Jus ad Bellum point of view, having provided cassus belli, its violations of 
United States sovereignty and territorial integrity through the act of war.  
A third section discusses the perception of exogenous and semi-exogenous actors 
within the construct of the triangular relationship between Al Qaeda, the Middle East and 
the United States. These actors are various in their composition and are defined as those 
that have a compelling interest in the relationship of Al Qaeda and the United States. This 
list is by no means complete but will minimally include the European Union, the United 
Nations and various multi-national corporations that are affected by the threat of hostile 
action or actual hostile action between Al Qaeda and the United States. 
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The perception of Al Qaeda, the United States and the exogenous actors provide a 
picture by which one can understand the motivations and duties sought by each 
respective actor. This sets the stage for the section on the historical government responses 
of the United States. Also, by examining the motivations of the United States, it helps to 
prepare for the evaluation of the case against the measurement criteria. 
The Al Qaeda organization believes that their actions are justified through an 
extreme interpretation of its religion.92 They believe that the United States is comprised 
of infidels that are meddling in the affairs of the Middle East and thus the affairs of all 
Islamic peoples. Further, through a rationale that allows Al Qaeda to believe that all 
citizens of the United States are complicit in the affront to the Islam, they are thus 
combatants under the fatwa issued by Osama Bin Laden and his deputies in 1998.93 Al 
Qaeda believes they are justified in killing any and all US citizens by whatever means 
necessary in order to secure their stated goals of an unoccupied Iraq, a Saudi Kingdom 
free of Western influence, the eradication of Israel and the inception of a sovereign 
Palestinian state. 
The perspectives of Al Qaeda are best explained within social, economic and 
political terms through the looking glass of oppression and tyranny. What this allows is a 
basic understanding of why Al Qaeda views the United States as an enemy and what Al 
Qaeda believes it is justified in doing in order to combat its perceived enemy. 
Socially, Al Qaeda believes that a culturally dominant United States has inflicted 
its decadent lifestyle upon much of the world, especially the Middle East. Also, the 
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United States’ criticism regarding the subjugation of women in Islam is latently offensive 
to the Al Qaeda organization.94 
Economically, Al Qaeda believes that a tyrannous United States has imposed its 
economic will through its oil interests in the Middle East, which has led to a decreased 
standard of living for the majority of citizens of Middle Eastern states. It is the contention 
of Al Qaeda that United States businesses, through aggressive resource extraction, have 
created a system by which much of the wealth of the region is exported leaving the 
indigenous citizenry unable to take advantage of the resources endowed to their 
respective countries.95 
Politically, the United States has been willing to exude pressure on various 
Middle Eastern states in order to achieve its stated goals. Al Qaeda views this action by 
the United States as a hegemon attempting to strong arm its policies onto other states. 
Furthermore, Al Qaeda believes that an oppressive United States has imposed its political 
will by basing many of its military assets in the region, ‘bribing’ ruling governments with 
foreign aid, and showing military willingness to unequivocally back Israel and invading 
Iraq in order to depose Saddam Hussein.96 
The United States perspective toward Al Qaeda is grounded in interpretation of 
international law that is both clear cut in terms of dealing with Al Qaeda but controversial 
when applied in the larger context of the United States’ war on terror.  After Al Qaeda 
bombed two embassies in East Africa in 1998, actions taken by the United States were 
condoned by the United Nations Security Council retroactively. The United States 
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reprisal included dozens of cruise missiles launched into Afghanistan aimed at Al 
Qaeda’s terrorist training camps.97 In 2000, the USS Cole was bombed while docked in 
the Middle East. The US launched a hunt to find those responsible for the egregious 
attack on the US Navy. Despite the efforts to neutralize Al Qaeda, their next attack would 
strike the very heart of the US and a symbol of it economic prowess.  
The attacks of September 11th, 2001 were condemned the next day by a special 
session of the Security Council and the United States was authorized to invoke its right to 
self-defense under various articles of the United Nations Charter.98 Again, the United 
States action in the overthrow of the despotic government of Afghanistan is authorized 
because Al Qaeda within the sovereign borders of Afghanistan knowingly allowed Al 
Qaeda to train, plan, and execute terrorist acts from within that country, thus constituting 
the Taliban’s sanction of subversive acts that threaten peace. Instances such as these have 
been well documented as just cause for action within the conduct of war, thus allowing 
the United States and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance to overthrow the 
Taliban and capture or kill remaining members of Al Qaeda within Afghanistan.99  
Where the United States begins to digress from its morally secured position 
within international norms and laws, is as it makes arguments for action against a broader 
war on terror, which has been the subject of the Iraq question leading up to the March 
2003 invasion of Iraq. In the lead up to that war, the United States argued a policy of 
preemption based upon the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The 
                                                 








argument (presence of weapons notwithstanding) was met with a great deal of skepticism 
by the United Nations and the world community.100  
The perspective of the United States is that the world changed on September 11th 
and in order to combat terrorism in an altered world, a policy of preemption must be 
supported. Further, because members of Al Qaeda are not directly represented by a state, 
they are not afforded the protections of the Geneva Convention. The United States 
believes that a new emphasis on human intelligence collection must rely heavily on 
interrogation and even relaxed definitions on torture.101 It would seem that the United 
States is acting in its own self-interest while disregarding established laws, norms and 
conventions regarding the just conduct of war and self defense. 
So on one hand, the United States is acting within the confines of international 
law as it relates to its direct war against Al Qaeda while, on the other hand, the United 
States has eschewed the norms and international law as it acts in it larger war on terror.  
In terms of exogenous and semi-exogenous world perspectives, there are three 
actors worth mentioning; they are the United Nations, the European Union and multi-
national corporations. The term exogenous or semi-exogenous is defined as actors that 
are not primary actors but still bear enough clout with either of these organizations or on 
the world stage so as to offer legitimacy by their opinions, deliberations, or judgments; 
these secondary (read: the United Nations and the European Union) and tertiary (read: 
affected multi-national corporations) are able to affect change only at the margins 
between the primary actors. 
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First, the United Nations serves as a stage in which to debate the morality and 
legality of the relationships by either of the two primary actors. For instance, the Security 
Council is able to pass judgment or provide non-binding authorization to states when it 
desires to contain elements of terrorism; like in the fall of 2001 during the overthrow of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan or during the spring of 2003 during the overthrow of the Iraqi 
government. The perspective of the United Nations is mostly to maintain the status quo in 
terms of conventional just war approach. This is to say that aggressive action is only 
warranted in the face of documented cassus belli and a strict prohibition against any 
policy of preemption.  
Second, the European Union has a much-fractured position when it comes to 
relations between the United States and Al Qaeda. For instance, in the aftermath of 
September 11th, 2001, the United States enjoyed broad support from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the broader European Union in terms of the coalition to remove 
the Taliban from power and capturing members of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.102 In stark 
contrast to that broad support, when the United States stated its intention to seek regime 
change in Iraq in the context of a broader war on terror, the European Union was split in 
two. On one hand were those states that sided with the United States.103 On the other 
hand, there were vocal and vehement opponents to the potential action in Iraq by a 
Franco-German policy that opposed military invasion of Iraq.104 It is believed by some 
that it was the vocal and staunch opposition of any unilateral action in Iraq, which 
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eventually caused the United States Secretary of State to seek approval from the United 
Nations Security Council for action in Iraq. The only overarching concern for the 
European Union is that they desire broad international consensus prior to aggressive 
action on the world stage, which is very internationalist in its stance.  
Third, there is the perspective of multi-national corporations that have operations 
that are affected by conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. As a caveat, 
terrorism and responses to terrorism directly raise the costs of doing business, i.e. security 
costs, etc. Because of this, there are businesses and industries that have been affected by 
the hostile relations between Al Qaeda and the United States. For instance, the airline 
industry has suffered from increased costs for security and taxes, which are met with a 
corresponding decline in the number of passengers. Also, transportation costs have 
greatly increased due to enhanced port security; or businesses that have operations or 
employees in areas affected due to increased terrorism have seen the market realize a 
premium in terms of price as it relates to providing goods or services in those areas. This 
has been a ‘thorn in the side’ of multi-national corporations in the time since September 
11th.105 The obvious preference for these multi-national corporations is to have nil costs 
attributed to terrorism related security; this perspective is important to remember during 
the evaluation at the end of this chapter as well as in the fifth chapter that discusses a 
better global framework. 
The three exogenous and semi-exogenous actors that are concerned with relations 
between Al Qaeda and the United States are the United Nations, the European Union and 
multi-national corporations that have business concerns that are affected by terrorism. 
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The United Nations has an interest as a deliberative body, the European Union has a 
desire to build broad consensus prior to actions as evidenced by the Brussels initiatives to 
build a common security and foreign policy, and businesses have a concern over security 
costs as they affect price elasticity within the marketplace. 
4.3 Current Governmental Responses 
How the United States has responded to the threat of terror in general and the 
transgressions of Al Qaeda specifically, are the subject of much debate. The current 
governmental response of the United States is in accordance with what it perceives to be 
a larger calling perhaps best encapsulated in the way the conflict is portrayed as a war on 
terror rather than a war against Al Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden. By casting the war in a 
broader context, the United States has let it be known that all perpetrators of terror will be 
the subject of scrutiny from the United States and its so-called ‘coalition of the willing.’ 
It is this broader context that allowed the United States, in its own mind, to be justified in 
invading Iraq, deposing its leader, and setting up a new government. After all, Iraq was 
part of the Axis of Evil, comprised of Iran, Iraq and North Korea.106 Looking toward the 
future, the United States has set the precedent and indeed the expectation that those states 
thought to be complicit in terror, will be met with the same fate as that of Iraq and 
Afghanistan.107 However, military response is still a tool of last resort. It is US policy to 
exhaust all non-violent means prior to military action.108 
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 In addition, the war on terror is not always a conventional war fought against a 
state. In many ways, it is more like a war on hunger or a war on drugs; it is a war on a 
phenomenon and because of that, this war is not traditional and the United States believes 
that winning the war on terror will likewise be untraditional.109 However, the United 
States believes that winning the war on terror will look something like creating 
“conditions so that those that use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the 
world.”110 This is an important statement, since it implies a long-term strategy for dealing 
with the causes of terrorism. In contrast, the American neoconservatives have responded 
to terror in ways that have not helped create conditions by which terror will be viewed as 
a less acceptable tool in the Middle East. 
The American neoconservative response to Al Qaeda and terrorism in general is 
like a newer, more military oriented phase of the neo-conservative movement. As 
mentioned above, the United States has a policy by which its government will 
aggressively pursue terrorists and terrorist organizations through policies of preemption 
and are willing to act unilaterally if necessary. The policies of the United States bear a 
few peculiarities that are worth mentioning, not just because of its neo-conservative tilt, 
but also because it marks a sea change in the United States’ foreign policy.  
First, the designation of captured terrorists as enemy combatants as opposed to 
prisoners of war, has allowed the government to deny rights afforded to combatants under 
the Geneva Convention. Next, prisoner abuse scandals, such as those at Abu Ghraib and 
                                                 







Guantanamo Bay have served to degrade the moral position of the United States.111 This 
moral degradation has left much of the world questioning the moral authority by which 
the US is executing its war on terror.112 
United States officials publicly contend that the threat of terror far outweighs jail 
abuse, which further exacerbates the situation,.113 The reclassification of detainees, 
prisoner abuses, and the denial of basic legal rights, has taken the United States from a 
position of moral clarity in fighting terrorism to a position that in some cases is morally 
dubious at best.  
Second, the neoconservative response has the long standing belief that democracy 
will create peace. As such, the United States has pursued aggressive and rapid policies of 
democratization for both Iraq and Afghanistan.114 Their policies ignore areas of the world 
where democracy has only been marginally effective like in much of Latin America.115 
So committed are the neo-conservatives to democratization, that policies of ‘democracy 
at any cost’ have seen funding shifted from the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan to 
funding more security, i.e. security forces instead on construction crews.116  
In many ways this is a ‘chicken or the egg’ question: The neo-conservative believes 
that a democracy will create good institutions; while others might contend that building 
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good institutions will lead to democracy. There are even some that believe rapid 
democratization will only lead to more violence.117 In fact, even with the democratically 
elected president of Afghanistan, it can be noted that he presides over a country that is 
not in the least bit peaceful or stable. So much for institutions to follow democracy as 
evidence points to new emerging leaders for Al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.118 The point being that democracy, the so-called neo-conservative silver bullet 
has a less than impressive record of accomplishment. 
 Third, the United States’ neo-conservative response has not focused adequately 
on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of citizens in the Middle East and confessors of Islam 
around the world. As the Arab and Muslim worlds continue to see the United States as 
occupiers, then it remains that the situation in Iraq will be one of pessimism.119 Further, 
while there have been instances where the killing of innocent Iraqis has been publicly 
explained by United States military officials, it is increasingly the case that the moral 
position of the United States in the region has sunk so low that mistrust rather than trust 
is how most public statements by the United States are viewed by the citizens of Iraq and 
its neighbors.120 
 Up until the beginning of 2005, the United States, specifically the 
neoconservative response of its leaders has been met with mixed success. It is the 
argument of this thesis that success should be measured by the criteria laid out in the third 
chapter through both the tactical and strategic prongs. 
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4.4 Measurement Criteria Evaluation 
By discussing measurement criteria across the qualitative medium, this work is 
able to discuss the tactical and then the strategic evaluations. This will show that the 
United States, in the assessment of this work, has made good marks in the tactical sense 
but is also far below par in the strategic goals of this approach. The prescription for the 
future is mixed and will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter’s case study.  
 As far as a tactical evaluation goes using the measures of military response, covert 
action and financial isolation, the United States government generally receives high 
marks.  Within the tactical prong and military response, the United States military forces, 
in the opinion of this work, effectively use conventional military forces and special forces 
to the best of its ability in order to tactically confront the threat of Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan.121 However, while there have been some critics that have contended that 
focusing on Iraq took the focus off of Al Qaeda, the evidence appears so conflicting and 
nascent so as to not bear mentioning in this work.122 In addition, the vision of military 
transformation from a Cold War defense posture to that of a light, rapid, expeditionary 
force is an effort to be commended since it helps the United States military respond faster 
in a world of shifting threats, perhaps most epitomized by the threat of terror.123 This 
rapid use of tactical military responses in a precision manner is a swift and considered 
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form of justice. In short, the initial military response in Afghanistan post September 11th, 
is the type of military response that the tactical prong proposes. Besides all of these 
institutional and technological changes, the US  military has fought a war that has 
minimized collateral damage and has remained a proportional as can be expected. 
 Now to the use of covert action, first off, evaluating changes in the nature of the 
clandestine operations of the United States is not something that this work is prepared to 
discuss specifically. However, it can be generally said that there appears in the media and 
through statements by public officials to be a shifting focus by the United States’ 
intelligence community. This shift is a sea change from reliance on the state’s national 
technical means124 to an emphasis on human intelligence and operational intelligence. In 
the opinion of this work, these changes are necessary, prudent and welcome with the use 
of covert action in the tactical prong of this approach.125 However, this work is concerned 
that the United States appears to have a willingness to deny basic rights to the captured or 
detained and that levels of interrogation appear to have drastically increased due to 
revised definitions of torture.126 The United States has stated that this is necessary as part 
of some supreme emergency based upon the struggle to win the war on terror.127  This is 
fairly unpalatable since the subject of emergency ethics is generally confined to examples 
where a threat is so enormous as to threaten the extinction of a society or a way of life, 
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e.g. genocide or England 1940-41 during World War Two.128 In any case, the United 
States gets good marks in terms of shifting the focus of its intelligence community while 
some major ethical questions are raised about the role of its intelligence community in the 
crafting and execution of interrogation policy.  
 Writing toward the use of financial isolation, the United States has unequivocally 
worked with the international community to financially isolate the work of terrorists. The 
very fact that the United States has learned the financial lessons of its war on drugs and 
applied those lessons to the war against Al Qaeda; by cutting off funding and forcing 
banks to identify suspicious lines of monies.129 The United States also appears to be 
erring on the side of caution attempting not to disrupt the commerce of capitalism as it 
financially isolates terrorist organizations.130 Additionally, terrorist plots can often be 
launched on the cheap but every little bit counts and the United States deserves high 
marks for it efforts to date.  
 In sum, the United States has performed well in executing its war against Al 
Qaeda as measured against the different facets of the tactical prong; to include military 
responses, covert action and financial isolation.131 
To write that the United States has room for improvement as evaluated against the 
strategic prong would be a drastic understatement. In fact, to evaluate the actions of the 
United States in its war on terror across the three pillars of the strategic prong; socio-
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political, economic and religion all entail anecdotes of either depressing failure or blatant 
inaction. 
To begin with the socio-political pillar of the strategic prong, the United States 
has done little to show to the Arab and Islamic world worlds that the United States is 
friend not foe.132 In fact, the United States has shown far more emphasis in attaining 
military victory, than fostering justice and liberty in the Middle East.133 Concerning 
institution building in the foreign sense, the United States seems more bent holding 
elections at any cost rather than creating the core institutions of a civil society, e.g. the 
primacy of law, civil liberties, protection from tyrannous majorities, et cetera.134 Out of 
this disregard for institutions comes how the United States has ignored the creation of 
basic rights, the stability of liberty, and the duties of citizens of a civil society. Instead, 
the opinion has been that from democratic elections will flow these institutional 
safeguards of society or are the responsibility for a sovereign indigenous government to 
deal with.135 This focus on importing Western democracy has led many to believe that 
terrorism only grows stronger as the United States fails to confront the realities of weak 
institutions and rights in the region.136 
 The second pillar in the strategic prong is the measure of economy. The reader 
will recall that the tenets of the economic pillar are sustainable development, just 
investment and an evolved sense of economic justice. In the foreign sense, the United 
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States has basically maintained the status quo. There has not been a remarkable amount 
of increased public investment in the Middle Eastern region. In fact, writing toward 
development and investment in Afghanistan, it would appear that the Afghan economy 
has regressed to producing the black market cash crop of poppy for use in the 
manufacture of heroine. In addition, the economies of the Middle East are still marked 
with the dubious distinction of severe income stratification between rich and poor, which 
negates any sort of sense of economic justice; although this could be ameliorated by 
allowing for an evolved social welfare system, the United States has not advocated any 
sort of reforms in the Middle East. The United States has had little effect in encouraging 
investment in the region beyond defense contracting and resource extraction although this 
work gives consideration to the United States given the tenuous security situation in the 
region.137 However, this is not an excuse for the overall system of economic oppression 
that occurs in the Middle Eastern region and the United States’ seeming willingness to 
ignore such oppression in favor of ‘going along to get along.’ 
 The fourth pillar of the strategic prong is that of religion, which suffice it to say, 
still leaves much to be desired. The United States has not placed sufficient emphasis on 
religious toleration in the region.138 The United States should stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ 
with leaders of the Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu and Buddhists faiths to preach 
commonality, condemn extremism, and foster an understanding of tolerance. Instead, 
much of Al Qaeda is still able to tap deep seeded emotions of religious hatred. 
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Furthermore, an effective separation of church and state as different organs within a state 
has not been properly emphasized in the opinion of this work.  
 And while each of the pillars that the United States has chosen to virtually ignore, 
are of a nature that they take several years to affect change, they are the single greatest 
tools for treating the causes of terrorism. 
The United States, by heavily emphasizing on the tools of the tactical prong while 
virtually ignoring the tools of root cause change within the strategic prong, is merely 
placing a band aid on the gaping wound that is the global terrorist insurgency of Al 
Qaeda. Further, this work would be remiss if it did not point out that by ignoring the 
pillars of the strategic prong, the United States will either suffer the continued effects of 
terrorism at best, or stoke the fire and create more powerful strains of terrorism, which 
will require attention in the future.139 
In conclusion, this case study is able to show the largest and most complex 
instance of global terrorism and how when evaluated against the approach of this work, 
the actions of the United States have received high marks for its tactical response and has 
room for improvement in it strategic response. 
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Chapter 5: Toward A Better Global Framework  
 The question becomes whether the approach espoused by this work, if followed, 
will leave the world a better place? This last chapter will attempt to show how the various 
entities of the world can move toward a better global framework. Also, this chapter will 
look at the measurement criteria and ways in which to measure its success in the future. 
This ultimately serves the purpose of expressing a vision for the future by showing how 
institution building based upon pragmatic normative goals will increase peace and 
prosperity in the global framework. 
The tactical prong lays out a careful cause and effect system for when action is 
permissible (based largely on just war theory) and, once action is permissible, how that 
action should be structured. The more the world community can create an integrated 
decision making body (under whatever auspices), the more the facets of the tactical prong 
may be applied for just causes of action. The caveat being that such a body must not 
become bogged down in bureaucratic largesse and should instead be capable of quick but 
deliberate decisions. The creation of such an institution will go a long way to help resolve 
conflict and understand the nature of a transparent decision making process. 
While strengthening international institutions and cooperation are laudable goals, 
the real heart of the matter is how to measure success and progress made under the 
normative ideals laid out in the strategic prong. The method of measurement within 
normative theories is often lacking so this will attempt to remedy that weakness through 





 The strategic prong advocates changes in socio-political, economy, and religion in 
order to affect root-cause change. The first success measure is the socio-political 
measure. In short, the strategic prong objectives should be deemed successful when such 
a time exists that the world is absent of fear from terrorism and the costs spent in the 
economy on security are in decline. Imagine a world where metal detectors are no longer 
necessary to board a commercial airliner or a world where the threat of terrorism seems 
anachronistic and is talked of in the same way as the Cold War. The strategic prong will 
have been successful in a world where the cost of doing business is unfettered by 
exorbitant security costs that make doing business cost prohibitive. The socio-political 
requirement will have been met when the huge budgets of anti and counter terrorism no 
longer seem necessary. To measure the absence of fear or the enhanced sense of security 
can be measured through survey data, but above and beyond that, the success of the 
strategic prong will have been successful when full length papers on governmental 
responses to terrorism no longer seem necessary or when discussion of terrorism is 
confined to the subject of history and not in the social sciences. 
 The greatest measure will be in the attitudes of society at large. When the citizens 
of the world become universally tolerant of dissimilar cultures and peoples, then the 
threat of terrorism will have been assuaged. When groups or individuals seek redress in 
non-violent means, then the success of the strategic prong measured in society will have 
been satisfied. In order for this to occur, oppression and tyranny must be ferreted out of 
the world in which we live so that peaceful manners of protest and change can by 





 Lastly, there are economic measures by which one can objectively measure the 
success or failure of the approach proffered by this work. It should be noted that 
perceived economic injustice is one of the many causes of terrorism today and in that 
spirit, the strategic prong will have met its objectives when all the economies of the world 
have embraced liberal models, with emphasis on an equitable distribution of wealth. 
Markets must be open and free to trade in order to gain efficiencies within the world 
economy but also governments must be committed to provide measures of social welfare 
for its citizenry, e.g. health care, compulsory education, et cetera. This will allow for 
citizens of the world to exist from a position of justice for once gross inequalities in the 
global distribution of wealth are resolved, then one of the ostensible reasons for terrorism 
will in effect disappear. In addition, when the transactional cost of doing business no 
longer includes costs for security, or those costs have become negligible, then the 
approach ought to be viewed as successful. 
So as this work on the US war on terror draws to a close, it is important to 
remember that the tactical and strategic prongs need to be employed together in order to 
achieve full effect in fighting terrorist attacks. However, while the tactical prong is best 
for immediate, near-term reaction to the terrorist threat; it is the strategic prong that 
allows for root cause changes in behavior over time, thereby stemming the tide of global 
terrorism.  
 The global fight against terrorism as begun after the tragic events of September 
11th is still in its infancy. Now is the best chance for attacked governments to undertake 
the aggressive measures for root cause change as advocated in the strategic prong. If a 
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